Thursday 19 November 2015

So what's happened before? A short history of UN climate negotiations.


Obama, Merkel Brown and Sarkozy at last minute negotiations on the final night at Copenhagen.
Will Paris end in such a last minute grasp? Photo Credit: Guardian/Getty Images 

Before analysing the initiatives (including the INDC pledges) that were intended to spur action on in the run-up to Paris, over my next two blogs I am going to outline the history of global climate governance. This will culminate in analysis of the varying approaches and  discourses on international climate policy questioning where COP21 sits within the spectrum.

The first phase of global negotiations on climate change began in force in 1992, when governments met in Rio de Janeiro successfully negotiating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the convention itself did not set binding specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries (leading to some disappointment), it recognized climate change as a serious threat and established the basis for future action. This was achieved through the defining of a common long term objective for the stabilization of greenhouse gases and outlined vital principles for future policy relating to inter/intra generational equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, precaution, cost-effectiveness, sustainable development and the international economy (Bodansky, 1993). Bodanksy argues in his highly cited paper that reaching an agreement in Rio, involving 140 states with very different interests and ideologies, in such a limited period of time was a "considerable achievement".

The UNFCCC paved the way for negotiation of a more specific protocol with binding commitments, culminating in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This included differentiated commitments by industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by,  5 per cent of 1990 emissions by 2012. However, Kyoto had its flaws. Due to prolonged problems with obtaining enough countries to ratify the protocol, Kyoto only entered into force in 2005. Furthermore, the Protocol was also limited in scope to Annex 1 countries, excluding developing countries, and critically the United States (the largest net emitter at the time and the largest cumulative emitter to date) who failed to ratify the deal, somewhat undermining the Protocol (Falkner et al., 2010).

Furthermore, the protocols commitment period ended in 2012 meaning it was over as soon as it started, requiring further negotiations to secure a post Kyoto global deal. An action plan that set the course for a new agreement to take over from Kyoto was agreed in 2007 at Bali (after much drama). The infamous Copenhagen conference (COP15) in December 2009 was intended to be the deadline to resolve debates about the post-2012 climate regime. Key questions surrounded whether the protocol should be extended in a second commitment period, should the new agreement be adopted under the Framework convention addressing the emissions of countries that did not ratify or were not under the jurisdiction of Kyoto (developing countries). Or should Kyoto be replaced through a more comprehensive agreement, targeting both the developed and developing (Bodansky, 2010).

Although there were high expectations that the conference would mark a significant breakthrough, hopes for a full-fledged legal agreement proved unrealistic. Instead after two weeks of negotiations only a political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord could be agreed upon. The Accord was very brief, two and a half pages effectively trashing the draft texts of nearly 200 pages . One major development however was the inclusions of a the long-term goal of limiting climate change to no more than two degrees Celsius (2°C) (Dimitrov, 2010).

One other important shift in Copenhagen was the focus on developing country emissions, "representing a significant reorientation of the climate change negotiations" (Bodansky, 2010). The developed-developing country debate moved from the sidelines where it had been since the Berlin Mandate in 1995 (which excluded any new commitments from non-annex 1 countries in negotiations for Kyoto) to center stage following the Bali Conference. Developed countries argued that any post-2012 agreement should include all of the major economies, regardless of development status. Developing countries argued, somewhat understandably that they are not as historically responsible, lack the propensity to respond and thus should not be expected to  undertake specific agreements. The Accord continues to have a differentiated structure but (Bodansky, 2010) argues that it begins to break the firewall between developed and developing countries: developed countries’ are required to have economy-wide emission targets, which will be subject to international monitoring and review (MRV), whereas developing countries’ actions, which will be subject to international MRV only if a mitigation action receives outside assistance, and otherwise to national MRV. Subtle nuances but significant nonetheless.

The Accord also specified the Establishment of a mechanism for "REDD-Plus" (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and recognized the importance of adaption in addition to mitigation in the fight against climate change.  Somewhat significantly for the developed/developing debate the conference also saw establishment of mechanisms for financial assistance including the goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020 to help countries adapt and mitigate. However, moving forward to Paris questions still remain unanswered with regards the sources of finance and what governance arrangements should be put in place (Bodansky, 2010).

Despite the progress, many commentators labelled the Copenhagen Conference a "failure whose magnitude exceeded our worst fears, and the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a desperate attempt to mask the failure"(Dimitrov, 2010). Even the accord was not formally adopted and instead "taken note of" following a coup by Bolivia, Sudan and Venezuela  raising questions (see next blog) about future prospects of the consensus-based UN approach (absence of formal objection) (Falkner et al., 2010). Since Copenhagen the development that stands out most to me is the development of INDCs, the ground rules of which were determined at COP20 in Lima. More on this next time!

Regardless of whether Copenhagen and ts predecessors were successful or failures they has paved the way for and set up Paris where it really is crunch time. What really matters is that the talks are successful. However, following the 'failures' of Copenhagen many academics began to question the future of the 'top down' UN process for responding climate change calling for 'bottom up' or 'building block approaches'. My next blog will analyse these claims in greater deal questioning whether a top down approach will ever be successful.

3 comments:

  1. A really helpful analysis of previous negotiations and how they paved the way for Paris, with insight into how the developing/developed world division has influenced the debate. How far the USA has shifted its position since Kyoto! Let us hope the next USA election does not set things back.

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  2. I could not agree more. Such positive change has been made but only time will tell if the outcomes and mechanisms of COP21 can truly be successful.

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  3. A helpful assessment of how we got to COP21 and failed to achieve sufficient progress! It can only get harder to change the longer we do little. Let us hope that the world's politicians and climate scientists will be able to design and implement effective measures to deliver COP21.

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